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MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL
ATTACKS AGAINST PASSENGERS ON MASS
TRANSPORTATION
I. Introduction
Every day an average of 2.8 million people ride the subways of New
York City.' New York ranks between third and fifth in annual rider-
ship among cities with subway systems. 2 The numerous problems
associated with transporting such large numbers of passengers include
crime and the fear it engenders in thousands of passengers annually. 3
This Note will discuss municipal tort liability for criminal attacks
against passengers. 4 The analysis will focus upon the liability of the
New York City Transit Authority (TA). 5 Comparisons will be made to
other mass transit systems6 in order to examine various theories con-
cerning the duty owed by the municipally-run transit system to its
passengers. 7 Recommendations will be offered to construct a clear
standard of care with corresponding limits on liability. 8
1. See N.Y. Times, June 14, 1983, at B3, col. 5. This figure is based on the total
average annual ridership of 1 billion. For the twelve months ended June 30, 1982,
the total was 991 million, and the total for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1983 was
approximately 1 billion. Id.
2. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1982, at B29, col. 3 and at B30, col. 1. The actual
rank has fluctuated due to a steady, long-term decline that decreased total annual
ridership from a peak of 2.051 billion passengers in 1947 to 991 million in 1982. This
rank is compared to Moscow, which has 2 billion riders; Tokyo, 1.8 billion; Paris, 1.1
billion; and Mexico City, slightly over I billion. Id. at 29, col. 3. The 1982 total
marked the first time New York City's ridership fell below I billion since 1917. Id.
However, Richard Ravitch, former chairman of the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, indicated that a "turn-around" was approaching and predicted that the
recent increase in ridership may continue. See N.Y. Times, June 14, 1983, at B3, col.
5.
3. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1983, at Al, col. 1. There were 15,192 reported
felonies in 1982 in the New York City subway system. Id. This figure included 17
reported homicides, compared with 13 in 1981. Id. at B9, col. 2.
4. Although this Note contains comparisons to some mass transit systems that
are limited to buses (see infra note 74 for a discussion of New Orleans Public Service,
Inc.), and it is recognized that "mass transit" may include buses, ferries and even
vans for the handicapped, discussion will focus upon subways and rails. The avail-
ability of data and case law for this narrow area lends itself to such a limited
discussion.
5. The New York City Transit Authority was established pursuant to NEW YORK
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW § 1201 (McKinney 1982). For a further discussion of the
enumerated powers and duties of the TA, see infra notes 21, 22 & 25.
6. See infra notes 71-150 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
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This Note will discuss various safety measures" and will analyze the
issues of whether the TA has assumed a duty to protect its passengers
by developing such measures to combat subway crime 10 and the subse-
quent funding necessitated by increased tort liability." Ultimately,
when a duty is recognized, the TA can avoid an onslaught of litigation
by maintaining an efficient security network which would decrease
crime and the TA's corresponding tort liability.
II. Tort Liability of Municipalities
The doctrine of municipal tort immunity grew out of the English
concept of sovereign immunity.' 2 No state liability in tort exists unless
consent is given.' 3 Consent has been given in all states to various
extents.' 4 In New York, this waiver of governmental immunity has
been held to apply to a municipality.'3
Mass transit systems may be operated either by a municipality
directly or by some other local governmental entity formed for that
specific purpose.16 A critical factor in determining liability for crimi-
9. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 166-85 and accompanying text.
12. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROsSER]. Sovereign immunity developed from the theory,
combined with the divine right of kings, that "the king can do no wrong," and
carried over from the English crown to the American states. Prosser notes a corollary
theory that immunity carried over to the state because of "heavy public debts of the
states and their precarious financial condition during the years immediately after the
Revolution . Id. at n. 48.
13. Id.
14. See generally PROSSER, supra note 12, at § 131. Examples of consent include
statutory authorization for particular individuals to maintain a suit in special courts
of claims, id. at note 53, and in the state's own courts for actions against it for
particular causes of action. Id. New York's consent is given in Section 8 of the Court
of Claims Act. The Act provides, in part, that "[t]he state hereby waives its immunity
from liability . . . and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the
same rules of law as applied ... against individuals or corporations ..... N.Y.
JUDICIARY COURT OF CLAIMS ACT LAW § 8 (McKinnev 1963).
15. See Becker v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 226, 140 N.E.2d 262, 159
N.Y.S.2d 174 (1957) (Court of Appeals held that effect of Section 8 of Court of
Claims Act is to make State and its subdivisions liable for negligent acts of their paid
employees); Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945)
(State's waiver of its sovereign immunity put an end to extension of municipal
immunity). However, this waiver of immunity has been held not to be absolute.
Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960) ("courts should
not be permitted to review determinations of governmental planning bodies under
the guise of allowing them to be challenged in negligence suits. ... ). Id. at 588,
167 N.E.2d at 67, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
16. See generally 30 AM. JuR. P.O.F. 2d 429, 460-61 (1982).
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nal attacks against passengers is the characterization of police protec-
tion as a governmental, as distinguished from a proprietary, func-
tion.' 7 In the absence of a statutory provision, there can be no
recovery against a municipal corporation for injuries occasioned by its
negligence or nonfeasance in the exercise of functions that are essen-
tially governmental in nature.' 8
This distinction is important with respect to the TA. If the opera-
tion of a mass transit system is a proprietary function, the standard of
care may be that required of common carriers.'" A common carrier,
although not an insurer of its passengers, is required to exercise the
utmost care and diligence for their safety.20
17. See generally 56 AM. Jun. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other
Political Subdivisions § 199 (1971). While in its performance of a governmental
function, the municipal corporation is "executing the legislative mandate with re-
spect to a public duty .... ." In its performance of a corporate or proprietary
function, it is "exercising its private rights as a corporate body." Id. at 256.
18. See generally 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 27
(1971). The municipal corporation, in the exercise of governmental functions, acts on
behalf of the general public as well as the inhabitants of its territory and represents,
in such capacity, the sovereignty of the state. Id. See also Bass v. City of New York,
38 A.D.2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dept. 1972), aJ-J'd, 32 N.Y.2d 894, 300 N.E.2d
154, 346 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973) (Housing Authority's maintenance of police force was
governmental activity; court refused to impose liability for rape of nine-year-old
girl).
19. See Kenny v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans. Auth., 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979) (Authority has duty to protect its patrons
when it reasonably expects criminal activity from anyone at its stations); McCoy v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 69 Ill. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977) (Chicago Transit
Authority has duty olved by common carriers); Eisman v. Port Auth. Trans Hudson
Corp., 96 Misc. 2d 678, 409 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (governmen-
tal transit authority, in performing proprietary functions, performs role of common
carrier).
20. See generally PRossER, supra note 12, at 180.
Common carriers, who enter into an undertaking toward the public for
the benefit of all those who wish to make use of their services, must use
great caution to protect passengers entrusted to their care; and this has
been described as "the utmost caution characteristic of very careful pru-
dent men," id. (quoting Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451 (1880)), or
the "highest possible care consistent with the nature of the undertaking."
Id. (quoting Carson v. Boston Elev. R. Co., 309 Mass. 32, 33 N.E.2d 701 (1941)). See
also Letsos v. Chicago Transit Authority, 47 Ill. 2d 437, 265 N.E.2d 650 (1970)
(common carrier's high degree of care toward its passengers includes responsibility to
prevent injuries which could have been reasonably foreseen and avoided by the
carrier); Eisman v. Port Auth. Trans Hudson Corp., 96 Misc. 2d at 681, 409
N.Y.S.2d at 580 (analogizing common carrier's duty to responsibility of a landlord
for criminal acts committed on its premises where there is duty to take steps to
prevent predictable criminal activities). See generally 14 AM. Jul. 2D Carriers § 916
(1964) (section 916, note 20 lists cases in numerous jurisdictions on the issue of a
common carrier's duty of care).
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The purpose of the TA, however, is legislatively designated as the
performance of a governmental function. 21 Despite this classification,
the Authority is responsible for the negligence of its employees in the
operation of the transit system. 22 The TA enjoys the benefit of passen-
ger revenue derived from performing what are classified in other
jurisdictions as proprietary functions of a common carrier.2 3 How-
ever, the TA's liability has been limited2 4 because it maintains its own
police force 25 and its statutory purpose is designated as a governmen-
tal function.26
21. See N.Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW § 1202(2) (McKinney 1982). "[S]uch
purposes are in all respects for the benefit of the people of the state of New York and
the authority shall be regarded as performing a governmental function in carrying
out its corporate purpose and in exercising the powers granted by this title." Id.
Subdivision one of this statute provides that:
The purposes of the authority shall be the acquisition of the transit facili-
ties operated by the board of transportation of the city and the operation
of transit facilities in accordance with the provisions of this title for the
convenience and safety of the public on a basis which will enable the
operations thereof, exclusive of capital costs, to be self-sustaining.
Id. at § 1202(1).
22. Id. at § 1212(3).
The authority shall be liable for, and shall assume the liability to the
extent that it shall save harmless any duly appointed officer or employee of
the authoritv for the negligence of such officer or employee, in the opera-
tion of a vehicle or other facility of transportation under the jurisdiction
and control of the authority, upon the public streets, highways or railroads
within the city, in the discharge of a duty imposed upon such officer or
employee at the time of the accident, injury or damages complained of,
while acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his
employment.
Id.
23. See supra note 19.
24. See Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 433 N.E.2d 124,
448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982). See also inJra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
25. See N.Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW § 1204(16) (McKinney 1982):
[The TA has the power] in its discretion to provide and maintain a transit
police department and a uniformed transit police force. Such department
and force shall have the power and it shall be their duty, in and about
transit facilities, to preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and
arrest offenders, suppress riots, mobs, and insurrections, disperse unlawful
or dangerous assemblages and assemblages which obstruct free passage;
protect the rights of persons and property; guard the public health; regu-
late, direct, control and restrict pedestrian traffic; remove all nuisances;
enforce and prevent violation of all laws and ordinances; and for these
purposes to arrest all persons guilty of violating any law or ordinance ....
Id.
26. See supra note 21.
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The TA is functionally analogous to the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey27 (Port Authority), which maintains its own police
force 28 while performing the proprietary functions of a common car-
rier. However, in Eisman v. Port Authority Trans Hudson Corp.,29
the Supreme Court, New York County, held that the Port Authority
can be liable for failure to provide police protection where there are
foreseeable risks to passenger safety. 30 Liability hinged upon the trial
court's determination that the Port Authority had assumed a duty to
its patrons by installing surveillance equipment to provide passenger
security.3 ' Given the theory that a common carrier must exercise the
utmost care and diligence for passenger safety, 32 it becomes necessary
to examine the corollary duty to provide police protection.
III. Duty to Provide Police Protection
No municipal tort liability exists for failure to provide police protec-
tion absent a special relationship between the police and the victim. 33
The New York Court of Appeals has held that the use of police
resources is a legislative-executive decision and that there is no duty to
provide protection to any individual. 34 A duty may arise, however, if
a special relationship has been established between the City and the
victim. 35
27. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-1 to 2-35 (West 1963 & Supp. 1983-1984) for
statutes concerning the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
28. See id. § 32:2-25 (powers given to members of police force appointed by Port
Authority).
29. 96 Misc. 2d 678, 409 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
30. Id. at 681, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
31. Id. at 682, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
32. See supra note 20.
33. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968); cf. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534,
180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (duty to use reasonable care for protection of persons who
collaborate with police in the arrest or prosecution of criminals). See generally E.
MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.51 (3d rev. ed. 1977)
(collecting cases); Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94
HARv. L. REV. 821, 822-28 (1981) (discussion of the no-duty rule) [hereinafter cited as
Police Liability]; Note, Municipal Tort Liability for Failure to Provide Adequate
Police Protection in New York State, 39 ALB. L. REV. 599 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Police Protection in New York]; Comment, Municipal Liability for Failure to Pro-
vide Police Protection, 28 FORDIIAM L. REV. 316 (1959); Note, A Governmental Duty
to Protect the Citizen-The Schuster Case, 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 289 (1959) (discus-
sion and analysis of Schuster v. City of New York, supra ).
34. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d at 581-82, 240 N.E.2d at 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 898.
35. See Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583
(1978) (assumption of duty to provide substitute for absent school crossing guard);
Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958)
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This no-duty rule is recognized, either judicially or legislatively 3 in
most jurisdictions.37 However, several jurisdictions recognize an ex-
ception to this rule for special relationships."6 New York recognizes a
(duty to protect informers); Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d
515 (2d Dept. 1966) (duty owed to persons under court orders of protection).
36. See, e.g., Police Liability, supra note 33, at 823 n. 12 (citing statutes granting
general statutory immunity for failure to prevent crime); PRossER, supra note 12, § 53
at 325-26. The tort concept of duty relied upon by the courts involves the question of
whether the defendant is under any obligation to the particular plaintiff and is "an
expression of the sum total of these considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." Id.
37. See, e.g., Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance, 39 Cal. App. 3d 588, 593,
114 Cal. Rptr. 332, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (California Tort Claims Act of 1963
"provides for immunity if no police protection is provided, or if that protection is
provided, if that protection is not sufficient"); Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147,
444 A.2d 1379 (1982) (town not liable to plaintiffs whose decedent was killed by an
intoxicated driver who, approximately one hour prior to accident, was stopped and
warned but not arrested by police officer); Freitas v. Honolulu, 58 Hawaii 587, 574
P.2d 529 (Hawaii 1978) (no liability despite knowledge by police that plaintiff's
brother had been convicted of violent crimes, had history of mental instability and
had previously threatened his brothers with rifle before actually shooting them);
Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871
(Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (no liability for failure of city police to halt crime wave which
resulted in retail grocery going out of business); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park,
279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979) (recognizing no-duty rule as analogy to failure to
discover fire code violation); Bruttomesso v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 95
Nev. 151, 591 P.2d 254 (Nev. 1979) (police not obligated to plaintiff to provide
security for outdoor film festival at which plaintiff was stabbed); Doe v. Hendricks,
92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (duty of police is to protect public
generally; no duty to protect individual plaintiff rape victim); Walters v. Hampton,
14 Wash. App. 548, 543 P.2d 648 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (city had no specific duty to
protect the plaintiff shooting victim). See generally 30 AM. JUR. P.O.F. 429, 437
(1982) (almost all states follow no-duty rule); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1972)
(collecting cases).
38. See, e.g., Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Ala. 1970) (suit
brought pursuant to provisions of Federal Tort Claims Act; government has special
duty to protect informant when there is reasonable cause to believe he is endangered
as a result of his aid to federal law enforcement officials); Miller v. United States, 530
F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (government liable for failing to provide police protec-
tion to informants); Stone v. State, 106 Cal. App. 3d 924, 165 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980) (special relationship arises upon voluntary assumption by public
entity or official of duty toward injured party; court declined to follow the excep-
tion); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981) (recognizing special
relationship exception to no-duty rule but finding no special relationship in case at
bar); Silverman v. City of Fort Wayne, 171 Ind. App. 415, 357 N.E.2d 285 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1976) (special relationship may exist upon personal promise given to victim by
certain city officials); Bruttomesso v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 95 Nev.
at 151, 591 P.2d at 254 (recognizing special relationship exception to no-duty rule but
finding no special relationship in case at bar); Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. at 499, 590
P.2d at 647 (special relationship arises out of some prior circumstance existing
between victim and police that imposed a duty on police, which extended beyond
ordinary public duty to protect crime victims). See also Note, Municipal Law-
Negligence-Failure of Police to Provide Protection to the Holder of a Family Court
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special relationship exception to the no-duty rule for police protection
both to the general public and to transit system passengers. 39 How-
ever, the adoption of the no-duty rule is based on a theory that is not
wholly applicable to transit systems. 40
The New York Court of Appeals in Riss v. City of New York 41 held
that the allocation of police resources for protection from criminal
wrongdoings is a legislative-executive decision for which there is no
liability. 42 However, the Riss court distinguished the duty to protect
the public generally from the duty of transit authorities to protect
their patrons. 43 This distinction would appear to impose a duty on the
TA equivalent to the duty that is required of common carriers. 44
The Riss court indicated that a duty to protect the public would be
too great a burden because of limited resources. 45 The court feared
that imposing a duty to protect would determine the allocation of
such limited resources without predictable limits. 46 However, in the
next sentence in the opinion, the court distinguished this unpredict-
ability for protection of the public generally from the predictability of
resources for transit systems. 47 This distinction may be interpreted to
mean that despite the fact that the TA is statutorily designated as
performing a governmental function, 48 the TA owes a higher duty of
care towards its passengers than has been recognized.
IV. Tort Liability of the TA
In Weiner v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority,49 the New
York Court of Appeals held that the TA owes no duty to protect a
Order of Protection States a Valid Cause of Action, 7 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 191, 199-
200 (1978) (citing cases); cases cited supra note 35.
39. See Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 433 N.E.2d 124,
448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982). See also infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 41-48.
41. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
42. Id. at 581-82, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
43. "It is necessary immediately to distinguish those liabilities attendant upon
governmental activities which have displaced or supplemented traditionally private
enterprises, such as are involved in the operation of rapid transit systems. . . . Once
sovereign immunity was abolished by statute the extension of liability on ordinary
principles of tort law logically followed." Id. at 581, 240 N.E.2d at 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d at 897-98 (emphasis added).
44. See supra note 20 for definition of a common carrier's duty.
45. 22 N.Y.2d at 581, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
46. Id. at 582, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
47. Id. "This is quite different from the predictable allocation of resources and
liabilities when . . . rapid transit systems . . . are provided." Id. (emphasis added).
48. See supra note 21 for a discussion of the statute.
49. 55 N.Y.2d 175, 433 N.E.2d 124, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982).
1984]
332 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XII
person on its premises from assault by a third person, absent facts
establishing a special relationship between the Authority and the
person assaulted. 50 The Weiner court further held that the allocation
of police resources to protect against criminal wrongdoing is a legisla-
tive-executive decision for which there is no liability.
51
Prior to Weiner, the TA was held to be a common carrier with a
duty to take reasonable precautions for the protection and safety of its
passengers .52 Whether a duty was properly discharged could be deter-
mined as a question of fact or as a matter of law depending on the
evidence presented. 53 The New York courts had held that where a
carrier was on notice that attacks had occurred in the area of its
premises, its duty to take reasonable precautions for protection and
safety of its passengers extended to taking reasonable precautions to
prevent recurrence of such incidents. 54
Although a common carrier does not insure the safety of its passen-
gers, 55 its duty is analogous to the responsibility of a landlord for
criminal acts on its premises when the landlord is on notice of recur-
ring criminal activities. 56 Moreover, a public utility, such as a com-
50. Id. at 178, 433 N.E.2d at 126, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
51. Id. at 181, 433 N.E.2d at 127, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
52. See Amoruso v. New York City Transit Auth., 12 A.D.2d 11, 207 N.Y.S.2d
855 (1st Dept. 1960) (per curiam) (court ordered new trial to determine whether TA,
a common carrier, complied with its duty to take reasonable precautions for protec-
tion and safety of its passengers); cf. Bardavid v. New York City Transit Auth., 82
A.D.2d 776, 440 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1st Dept. 1981) (passenger attacked at subway
station entrance that had prior, recent criminal activity); Shernov v. New York City
Transit Auth., 79 A.D.2d 1021, 435 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dept. 1981), aff'd sub. nom.,
Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175 (1982) (assault and attempted
rape of passenger in subway station with history of such assaults).
53. Compare Langer v. City of New York, 9 Misc. 2d 1002, 171 N.Y.S.2d 390
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958), aj'd, 8 A.D.2d 709, 185 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1959) (court, sitting
without a jury, found as matter of fact that carrier had properly discharged its duty
toward injured passenger) with Moriarity v. New York City Transit Auth., 11
A.D.2d 654, 201 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1st Dept. 1960) (mem.) (where no proof of prior
crimes and officer was present in station at time of assault on passenger, it may be
held as matter of law that TA discharged its duty properly).
54. See Bardavid, 82 A.D.2d at 776, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
55. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of common carrier
doctrine.
56. See Eisman v. Port Auth. Trans Hudson Corp., 96 Misc. 2d at 681, 409
N.Y.S.2d at 580 (duty of common carrier to protect passengers analogous to land-
lord's responsibility for criminal acts committed on its premises); cf. Kline v. 1500
Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (although, as general rule,
private person does not have duty to protect another from criminal attack by third
person, landlord owes duty to take reasonable steps to protect tenant from foresee-
able criminal acts committed by intruders on premises). See generally Selvin, Land-
lord Tort Liability for Criminal Attacks on Tenants: Developments since Kline, 9
REAL ESTArE L.J. 311 (1981); Smith, The Landlord's Duty to Defend His Tenants
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mon carrier, may be required to take additional steps to protect its
patrons when there is a reasonable expectation of a dangerous condi-
tion on the premises. 57 These additional steps may lead to an assump-
tion of a duty by the common carrier to its passengers when, for
example, the carrier installs surveillance monitoring equipment at its
stations.
5 s
After Weiner, a passenger injured by a rock thrown through a train
window brought an action against the TA. 59 The trial court inter-
preted Weiner as immunizing the TA in any case where a passenger is
attacked by a third party, absent a special relationship.6 0 However, in
Giamboi v. New York City Transit Authority,6 the Civil Court,
Against Crime on the Premises, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 587 (1982); Stalmack, The
Illinois Landlord's Obligation to Protect Persons on His Premises Against The Crimi-
nal Activities of Third Persons, 68 ILL. B.J. 668 (1980); Comment, The Landlord's
Duty in New York to Protect His Tenant from Criminal Intrusions, 45 ALB. L. REV.
988 (1981); Note, Landlord Liability for the Criminal Acts of Third Parties: Recent
Developments in Connecticut, 14 CONN. L. REV. 843 (1982); Note, Landlord Has
Duty to Protect Tenant from Foreseeable Criminal Acts of Intruders in Common
Areas, 1970 DvxK L.J. 1046 (1970); Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from
Criminal Acts of Third Parties: The View from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 GEO.
L.J. 1153 (1971); Note, Crime in Apartments: Landlord Liability, 5 GA. L. REV. 349
(1971); Case Comment, Landlord Held Negligent for Criminal Assault by Third
Party Intruder on Tenant, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (1971); Note, Responsibility of
Landlords for Criminal Acts of Third Persons, 48 N.C.L. REv. 713 (1970); Note,
Landlord Liability to Tenants for Crimes of a Third Party: The Status in Florida, 6
NOVA L.J. 145 (1981); Note, Landlord's Responsibility to Tenant for Criminal Acts
Committed by Third Persons: A View Since Kline vs. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue
Apartment Corporation, 17 S. TEx. L.J. 270 (1976); Note, Landlords of Multiple-
Unit Apartment Houses Have a Duty to Take Protective Measures to Guard Their
Tenants from the Perpetration of Foreseeable Criminal Acts by Third Persons, 49
TEx. L. REV. 586 (1971); Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Foreseeable
Criminal Acts of Third Parties: Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment
Corporation, 32 U. PITT. L. REV. 267 (1970); Comment, A Landlord's Duty to
Protect His Tenants from the Criminal Acts of Third Persons, 5 U.S.F.L. REV. 378
(1971); Note, Landlord Owes Duty to Provide Protection for Tenants Against Crimi-
nal Acts by Third Parties, 24 VAND. L. REV. 195 (1970); Note, Landlord Held to a
Duty of Reasonable Care to Protect Tenants from Foreseeable Criminal Acts Com-
mitted by Third Parties in the Common Areas of an Apartment Building, 16 VILL. L.
REV. 779 (1971); Casenote, Commercial Landlord's Liability for Criminal Acts of a
Third Party, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1483 (1976); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972) (citing
cases).
57. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 344 comment e (1965).
58. See, e.g., Eisman, 96 Misc. 2d at 682, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 581 ("[i]t is ancient
learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become
subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all") (quoting Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922)).
59. See Ammirati v. New York City Transit Auth., 117 Misc. 2d 213, 457
N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1983).
60. Id. at 217, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
61. 120 Misc. 2d 33, 465 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1983).
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Kings County, recently denied a motion to dismiss an action involving
a personal injury sustained by a passenger struck by a bottle thrown
from a train platform.6 2 This court interpreted Weiner as not impart-
ing a total shield of tort immunity around the TA. 3 Rather, it held
that, although Weiner absolves the TA for failure to post additional
police at a station, it does not grant immunity when injury results
from a dangerous condition. 4
If Giamboi is upheld, the TA's liability would be increased because
a dangerous condition can be interpreted to include, as here, any area
where the TA has notice of repeated vandalism or criminal activity. 5
This is in line with the analysis of Bardavid v. New York City Transit
Authority,"' which cited the appellate division's Weiner decision as
authority for its holding that a duty to protect arises when the TA has
notice of prior criminal activity.6 7 However, Bardavid was neither
discussed nor overruled by Weiner in the Court of Appeals. Ulti-
mately, a duty to provide police protection may be recognized despite
Weiner because of the possibility of particular stations being deemed
dangerous, such as those with a high frequency of crimes.6 8
Certain factors considered in the labeling of a station as dangerous
may include: the number of passengers using such station; the utiliza-
tion of adequate lighting or the lack thereof; the architectural design
of the station including alcoves, connecting passageways and place-
ment of exits and entrances; the frequency with which trains arrive
and depart; and the frequency of and the patterns readily discernible
from past criminal activity in the station."' Given the ease with which
Weiner was circumvented, 70 it becomes clear that a more specific
62. Id.
63. Id. at 34, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
64. Id. at 161-62. See text preceding note 69 for factors which may be relevant in
defining "dangerous condition."
65. See infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
66. 82 A.D.2d 776, 440 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1st Dept. 1981) (mem.) (involving also a
question of whether plaintiff was actually a passenger when she entered alcove to
take elevator docwn to train platform).
67. Id. at 776, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
68. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text for conditions placing a transit
authority on notice. A duty to take precautions against crime may include a duty to
provide police protection if that is the only feasible safety measure available. See
infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text for a case where a duty to provide police
protection arose because such protection had been given in the past.
69. This is not an exclusive list of possible factors. Although stations need to be
examined on an individual basis, TA crime reports should provide a starting poiht for
such an examination.
70. See Giamboi v. New York City Transit Auth., 120 Misc. 2d at 34, 465
N.Y.S.2d at 161 (court limited Weiner to include only the issue of police protection,
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standard of care is needed. An analysis of other theories is valuable at
this point.
V. Theories of Recovery
A. Common Carrier
Classifying a municipally-run transit system as a common carrier
would impose on it a duty to exercise the highest degree of care and
diligence consistent with the circumstances in order to provide for
passenger safety. 7' Courts have used this standard for such transit
systems as the Chicago Transit Authority, 72 the Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania Transporation Authority, 73 and New Orleans Public Service,
Inc. 74 New York courts had applied this standard 75 until Weiner
thereby distinguishing Weiner and adding to ambiguity of this issue by using phrase
"dangerous condition").
71. See supra note 20 for a discussion of the common carrier doctrine.
72. See, e.g., McCoy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 69 Ill. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625
(1977) (common carrier has responsibility to prevent injuries which could have been
reasonably foreseen and avoided by carrier); Fujimura v. Chicago Transit Auth., 67
Ill. 2d 506, 368 N.E.2d 105 (1977) (Chicago Transit Authority owes highest degree of
care in contrast to other public entities); Katamay v. Chicago Transit Auth., 53 Ill.
2d 27, 289 N.E.2d 623 (1972) (carrier owes duty to exercise highest degree of care for
passenger who is in act of boarding, is upon, or is in act of alighting from, carrier's
vehicle); Watson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 52 I11. 2d 503, 288 N.E.2d 476 (1972)
(citing Letsos infra); Letsos v. Chicago Transit Auth., 47 Ill. 2d 437, 265 N.E.2d 650
(1970) (carrier is bound to exercise high degree of care toward its passengers and has
responsibility of preventing injuries which it can reasonably foresee and avoid);
Haynes v. Chicago Transit Auth., 59 Ill. App. 3d 997, 376 N.E.2d 680 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978) (common carrier has duty to exercise reasonable care and caution for preven-
tion of reasonably foreseeable assaults in its stations and on its platforms).
73. See, e.g., Kenny v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979) (carrier's duty to protect is based
on whether it could reasonably have expected criminal activity from anyone at its
station); Carswell v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 259 Pa. Super. 167,
393 A.2d 770 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (public utility may be required to take additional
steps to control conduct of third persons, or otherwise to protect patron against it);
Mangini v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 235 Pa. Super. 478, 344 A.2d
621 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (common carrier is held to highest degree of care).
74. See, e.g., Orr v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 349 So. 2d 417 (La. Ct. App.
1977) (citing Aime infra); Campo v. George, 347 So. 2d 324 (La. Ct. App. 1977)
(citing Aime infra); Vaughan v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 314 So. 2d 545 (La.
Ct. App. 1975) (citing Aime infra); Aime v. Hebert, 282 So. 2d 566 (La. Ct. App.
1973) (public carrier of passengers for hire is required to exercise highest degree of
vigilance, care and precaution for safety of its passengers). The Louisiana Supreme
Court, however, held that New Orleans Public Service, Inc. does not owe the highest
duty of care associated with common carriers. Rodriguez v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc., 400 So. 2d. 884 (1981). The Rodriguez court avoided overruling the prior cases
applying the common carrier doctrine by indicating that they, as a practical matter,
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immunized the TA without analyzing the applicability of the common
carrier doctrine. 78
The existence of a duty ultimately depends upon a choice between
competing policies. The common carrier doctrine, if accepted, re-
quires a high duty of care 77 which logically should include police
protection to safeguard the passengers. Alternatively, there is no duty
to provide police protection absent a special relationship. 78 Therefore,
courts face a situation where they must opt for one of the conflicting
rules.
These two policies compete in cases where the municipally-run
transit system provides its own police force 79 and where police protec-
tion is provided as part of the general city police force. 80 The rule
rejecting a duty unless a special relationship is found8 applies in both
instances82 despite the argument that in the former the transit author-
ity appears to have assumed a duty by providing its own police force
rather than relying upon the city.83
used substantially the same approach even though Rodriguez applied a business
establishment standard. Id. at 888 n.4. See infra notes 146-49 for a discussion of the
business establishment standard.
75. See supra note 52.
76. 55 N.Y.2d 175, 433 N.E.2d 124, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982).
77. See supra note 20.
78. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
79. For example, the New York City Transit Authority provides and maintains
its own police force. See supra note 25 for the statute authorizing this.
80. For example, the city of Chicago has assumed the role of policing the rapid
transit stations run by the Chicago Transit Authority. See Marvin v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 113 I11. App. 3d 172, 446 N.E.2d 1183 (I11. App. Ct. 1983) for an example
where this fact was argued as creating a special relationship.
81. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
82. Compare Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d at 175, 433
N.E.2d at 124, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 141 (TA has no duty to provide police protection)
with Marvin v. Chicago Transit Auth., 113 Ill. App. 3d 172, 178, 446 N.E.2d 1183,
1188 (111. App. Ct. 1983) ("[r]ecognizing a duty of the highest degree of care owed
generally by police officers to passengers of the Chicago Transit Authority ... would
place the police department in the position of virtual insurers of the personal safety of
every passenger, certainly an untenable result").
83. In Weiner, the court conceded the fact that the TA's maintenance of a police
force complicates the issue of what duty is owed to passengers. 55 N.Y.2d at 181, 433
N.E.2d at 127, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 143. However, the court failed to analyze this part of
the issue and bypassed the whole argument by deciding that it was not a controlling
factor in the determination of liability. Id. at 182, 433 N.E.2d at 127, 448 N.Y.S.2d
at 144. The court stated that this should not change the responsibility of the TA
because the judiciary should not interfere with the legislative-executive decision to
provide a police force. Id. As noted earlier, however, the Weiner court failed to
recognize the distinction made in Riss v. City of New York between police protection
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B. Notice of Dangerous Condition
A second theory imposes liability where the crime occurred in an
area that presented a dangerous condition and where the transit
authority had notice of such condition.8 4 This is the position taken by
the court in Giamboi v. New York City Transit Authority.15 The
plaintiff in Giamboi was struck by a bottle thrown from an improp-
erly enclosed train station. The court denied summary judgment in
light of the factual issues of whether a dangerous condition existed at
the station and whether notice had been provided to the TA. 8  The
evidence indicated that the TA was aware of repeated acts of vandal-
ism at the station and in its vicinity as a result of several newspaper
articles concerning the area. 7
A transit authority was held to have been on notice when it knew of
a robbery committed three months earlier at the same station as the
case in point and two robberies a few months earlier at a nearby
station.8 8 Notice also was found when a train's conductor noted that
three men had boarded a train in a high crime area and bothered a
generally and police protection for rapid transit systems. See supra notes 41-47 and
accompanying text.
84. The terms "dangerous condition" and "notice" are not easily defined. Possi-
ble factors to be considered by the courts in determining whether a dangerous
condition exists may include those listed in the discussion in the text preceding note
69. These factors should be considered by the jury and not ruled on as a matter of
law. See, e.g., Haynes v. Chicago Transit Auth., 59 I11. App. 3d 997, 1001, 376
N.E.2d 680, 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
The factors determining when a transit authority is on notice may include the
number of crimes previously committed at a particular station or on a specific route.
This information may be gathered from internal reports and memoranda issued by
the transit authority or from privately funded studies and newspaper accounts.
Another factor may be the knowledge of transit personnel that a person or persons
appear to be engaged in suspicious activity or are inebriated or otherwise mentally
unbalanced with possible violent or criminal propensities. See, e.g., McCoy v. Chi-
cago Transit Auth., 69 Ill. 2d 280, 288, 371 N.E.2d 625, 629 (1977); Marvin v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 113 Ill. App. 3d 172, 174-75, 446 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983); Mangini v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 235 Pa. Super.
478, 480, 344 A.2d 621, 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
By using these factors, the problems of stereotyping an entire transit system as
crime ridden, and the accompanying municipal fear of dramatically increased liabil-
ity, are avoided. Liability would attach to crimes committed only in those stations or
areas where there is knowledge of a dangerous condition or knowledge of previous
crimes unless the circumstances for the particular incident indicate that notice had
been given immediately prior to such incident.
85. 120 Misc. 2d 33, 465 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983).
86. Id. at 162.
87. Id. at 161.
88. Haynes v. Chicago Transit Auth., 59 11. App. 3d 997, 376 N.E.2d 680 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978).
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passenger. 89 The court concluded that the conductor knew or should
have known of the propensity of the men to cause trouble and had
both the time and ability to prevent the subsequent assault, but failed
to take necessary precautions. 0
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has implied a duty when the
transit authority could reasonably have expected criminal activity
from anyone at its station.9' The transit authority was placed on
notice when it learned that crime had increased throughout the entire
system and when it failed to maintain adequate lighting at a station.
92
The court indicated that although steps had been taken to increase
police protection, it could not say as a matter of law that this was
enough to preclude tort liability. 93
A carrier may be liable for reasonably anticipated acts or conduct of
third persons. 4 It has been found that negligence occurs when the
carrier can reasonably anticipate the force, means or conduct which
causes an object to be propelled so as to penetrate a window and
injure a passenger. s However, the carrier will not be liable solely for
the failure to install safety glass if the incident could not be reasonably
anticipated. 6
C. Special Relationship
Weiner leaves open the possibility of a duty to protect passengers if
the facts establish a special relationship between the TA and the crime
victim. 7 The court cited two cases illustrating such a special relation-
ship in situations involving a duty to protect police informers 8 and
assumption of a duty to provide a substitute for a school crossing
guard.99
89. See McCoy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 69 Ill. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977).
90. Id. at 289, 371 N.E.2d at 629.
91. See Kenny v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
92. Id. at 354-55.
93. Id. at 354.
94. See Jackson v. Bi-State Transit System, 550 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(per curiam) (bus passenger injured when struck in face by object that penetrated
window).
95. Id. at 233.
96. Id. at 232.
97. 55 N.Y.2d at 178, 433 N.E.2d at 126, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
98. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
99. See Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583
(1978).
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In Crossland v. New York City Transit Authority, °10 the Supreme
Court, Kings County, recently denied a motion to dismiss a wrongful
death suit against the TA for the murder of a high school student on a
subway platform by "a group of thugs."1'0 The court held that since
the TA "had already budgeted full twenty-four hour police coverage"
at the station as a deterrent because of the "high and violent crime
rate" there, a special relationship was established.'0 2 The court found
Florence v. Goldberg0 3 controlling rather than Weiner.'14 In Flor-
ence, the New York Court of Appeals held New York City liable for
voluntarily assuming a duty to protect a particular class of persons,
and then negligently withdrawing that protection, causing injury to a
member of that class. 05 The Crossland court also ruled that a question
of fact remained as to when the police officers left their post.'06
This holding is important because it implies that there is a duty to
provide police protection once the TA has posted officers at a particu-
lar station on a regular basis. 0 7 However, since this is the first New
York case discussing the possible definition of "special relationship"
with respect to the TA, it is necessary to look at cases in other jurisdic-
tions to develop a definition by analogy.
In Marvin v. Chicago Transit Authority ,108 the Illinois Appellate
Court listed four requirements of the "special duty" exception, 09
whereby the police owe a duty to an individual, as contrasted with the
public at large:
100. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1984, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Jan. 18, 1984).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978).
104. The court found that the plaintiff in Weiner contested "the manner and
fashion of where the police protection should have been deployed . . ." whereas "in
the instant case, the police were already deployed and, allegedly assigned to guard
the 125th Street Station for 'round the clock' protection and the police coverage was
withdrawn during a period preceding the shift change." N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1984, at
13, col. 3 & 4.
105. 44 N.Y.2d at 197, 375 N.E.2d at 767, 404 N.E.2d at 577-78.
106. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1984, at 13, col. 4.
107. The effect of the holding is to require police protection once such a policy is
initiated. This would appear to complicate the status of the no-duty rule by recogniz-
ing a present and a future duty conforming to past performance.
108. 113 Ill. App. 3d 172, 446 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (plaintiff was
beaten by six youths who were permitted by police officer to enter train station
despite facts that they appeared intoxicated and had threatened plaintiff in presence
of police officer).
109. Plaintiff's first amended complaint alleged that the city assumed a "special
relationship" to passengers of the rapid transit system by assuming "almost full"
responsibility to police its facilities. On appeal, plaintiff contended that this states a
cause of action under the "special duty" exception to the general rule that there is no
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
(1) [t]he municipality must be uniquely aware of the particular
danger or risk to which plaintiff is exposed; (2) there must be
allegations of specific acts or omissions on the part of the munici-
pality; (3) the specific acts or omissions must be either affirmative
or willful in nature; and (4) the injury must occur while the plain-
tiff is under the direct and immediate control of employees or
agents of the municipality." 0
The court went on to hold that the plaintiff could not satisfy the
fourth requirement merely by alleging that a police officer directed
him to descend to the train platform where he was beaten by six
youths. 1
In Chapman v. City of Philadelphia,112 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court defined a special relationship as existing only when "an individ-
ual is exposed to a special danger and the authorities have undertaken
the responsibility to provide adequate protection for him." 1 3 The
court held that such a relationship did not exist between plaintiff's
decedent and the City of Philadelphia despite the fact that he was
murdered on a train platform in a dangerous area of the City.' 14
In general, municipalities are not liable for inadequate police pro-
tection unless they undertake some action which creates a duty.' l'
Thus, a municipality may be liable if police act negligently when they
have knowledge of a person's situation,"" but will not be liable if they
do not act at all since there is no assumption of a duty.1 7 The
assumption of a duty was defined, in ambiguous language, by the
court in Riss v. City of New York I" as occurring in a "situation where
the police authorities undertake responsibilities to particular members
of the public and expose them, without adequate protection, to the
risks which then materialize into actual losses."""
By using these definitions, courts have limited municipal tort liabil-
ity to basically two categories: (1) where the plaintiff is harmed as a
tort liability for failure to exercise general police powers. Marvin, 113 Ili. App. 3d at
176, 446 N.E.2d at 1185.
110. Id., citing Curtis v. County of Cook, 109 Ill. App. 3d 400, 407, 440 N.E.2d
942, 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Bell v. Village of Midlothian, 90 I11. App. 3d 967, 970,
414 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
111. 113 Ill. App. 3d at 177, 446 N.E.2d at 1185.
112. 290 Pa. Super. 281, 434 A.2d 753 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
113. Id. at 283, 434 A.2d at 754.
114. Id. at 284, 434 A.2d at 755.
115. See generally Police Liability and Police Protection in New York, supra note
33.
116. See supra note 38 for cases recognizing special relationships.
117. See supra note 37 for cases recognizing the no-duty rule.
118. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
119. Id. at 583, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899,
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result of assisting police activities and (2) where the police extended
express promises of protection to specific individuals. 2 0 However, in a
recent decision the Oregon Supreme Court has ruled that abused
wives can collect damages from police who fail to protect them.' 2'
The case arose under a 1977 statute 22 that gives abused wives the
right to seek judicial protective orders, and states that police "shall"
arrest, upon probable cause, any husband believed to be violating
such an order of which he has knowledge. 23 By recognizing the
legislative creation of a duty, the court expanded the police duty to
protect beyond the previous two categories.
An analogy may be drawn to the duty of the TA police as described
in section 1204(16) of the New York Public Authorities Law. 124
Among those listed are the duties to "prevent crime," 125 to "detect and
arrest offenders," 2 2 and to "protect the rights of persons and prop-
erty."127 The Oregon Supreme Court has relied heavily on the manda-
tory "shall" language of the abuse protection law 2 8 to infer the exis-
tence of a statutory tort that did not have to be grounded in common
law negligence. 29 New York courts may find a similar tort action
since the New York statute uses the same type of mandatory language
when it states that the TA transit police department "shall have the
power and it shall be their duty . . ." to perform the enumerated
functions.130 Given a similar interpretation, this language may create
both a special relationship between the TA and its passengers and a
concomitant duty to protect such passengers.
120. See generally Police Liability, supra note 33 at 825-26.
121. Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702 (1983). See also National Law Journal, Oct.
24, 1983, at 3, col. 1 (discussion of Nearing).
122. OR. REv. STAT. § 133.310 (1981).
123. The statute provides:
(3) A peace officer shall arrest and take into custody a person without a
warrant when the peace officer has probable cause to believe that:
(a) There exists an order issued pursuant to ORS 107.095 (1)(c) or (d),
107.716 or 107.718 restraining the person; and
(b) A true copy of the order and proof of service on the person has been
filed as required by ORS 107.720; and
(c) The peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has violated the term of that order.
Id. (Emphasis added)
124. See N.Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW § 1204(16) (McKinney 1982), supra note
25.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See National Law Journal, Oct. 24, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
129. Id.
130. N.Y. PUBLIc AUTHORITIES LAW § 1204(16) (McKinney 1982).
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A special relationship may also arise upon installation of security
measures such as surveillance equipment. 3' This was at issue in Eis-
man v. Port Authority Trans Hudson Corp.,3' where the plaintiff was
assaulted and raped at a PATH station. One of the counts in the
complaint alleged that defendants failed "to adequately maintain and
monitor a remote control television surveillance system which had
been installed to prevent criminal activity." 133 The court denied a
motion to dismiss since it may be found that defendants assumed a
duty to the plaintiff if it can be proved that the surveillance equip-
ment was installed to provide passenger security.13 4
In summary, a special relationship exists where a person assists the
government in a capacity such as informer, 13 5 where the police ex-
pressly promise or actually provide protection, 136 where a statute
creates a duty, 37 and possibly where transit systems install security
devices.138 Upon consideration of analogous situations, the TA may be
found liable under the latter two examples of this theory and possibly
under the second. 30
D. Other Theories
Liability may attach to the municipality where it knows that a
particular assailant has dangerous propensities. 140 Thus, there will be
no liability for a criminal attack by an unknown assailant even if the
attack occurs in a dangerous area.'14 However, there will be liability
where, for example, a passenger is attacked and the attacker escapes
but returns shortly thereafter and commits another assault. 142 The
131. The reference to surveillance equipment relates to passenger security, not to
internal devices to insure that token clerks handle money properly.
132. 96 Misc. 2d 678, 409 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
133. Id. at 679, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
134. Id. at 682, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
135. See supra notes 38 and 120.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
139. A possible argument for liability under the second example may be based on
a reliance theory. If police protection is provided on a regular basis at a specific
station, the TA may be liable for a criminal attack if such police protection is
withdrawn. See, e.g., inira notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
140. See Hall v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 84 Fla. 9, 93 So. 151 (1921); Alvarez
v. Metropolitan Dade County, 378 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (citing
Hall).
141. See Alvarez, 378 So. 2d 1317, 1318.
142. Id. at 1318 (citing Hall v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 84 Fla. 9, 93 So. 151
(1921) as still the law in Florida).
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carrier would not be liable for the first attack, but since it was on
notice of the person with dangerous propensities, it would be liable for
the second attack. 143 This theory, however, does not help the victims
because recovery appears to be limited to crimes committed by repeat
offenders. It seems illogical to award damages for a murder commit-
ted by a known criminal but not to award damages in an identical
case involving an unknown assailant, or no award for a murder but an
award for a subsequent assault.
A variation on the common carrier theory involves a duty to exer-
cise a high degree of foresight as to possible dangers and a high degree
of prudence in guarding againstthem. 44 This duty has been held to be
satisfied where a municipal bus driver warned his passengers to quiet
down and later stopped his bus to seek police assistance when one
passenger produced a gun. 45 The foresight requirement is acceptable
inasmuch as it comports with the duty required under the other
theories. However, the duty and the fulfillment thereof appear con-
tradictory since seeking police assistance after an altercation has be-
gun may be considered hindsight. A subsequent finding of no munici-
pal tort liability would, in effect, absolve the municipality for its
failure to guard against possible dangers.
A final theory uses the standard required of business establish-
ments.146 The Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that since public
carriers are essentially operating a business that permits the public to
enter its premises, they should be held to the same duty as a reason-
able business establishment with respect to hazards not associated
with the nature of carriage of passengers. 4 7 This duty includes keep-
ing the premises safe from unreasonable risks of harm or warning
persons of known dangers. 48 When the independent, intentional or
criminal acts of a third person 'constitute the unreasonable risk, the
duty can be discharged by summoning the police at the time the
143. Id.
144. See City of Dallas v. Jackson, 450 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1970) (plaintiff's decedent
was shot and killed on municipal bus by another passenger).
145. Id. at 63.
146. See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 999 (1979) (citing cases discussing liability
of owner or operator of shopping center, or business housed therein, for injuries to
patrons on premises from criminal assaults by third parties); Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d
1269 (1977) (citing cases discussing liability of storekeeper for death or injury to
customer in course of robbery); 57 AM. Jun. 2D Negligence §§ 63, 206-208 (1971); 62
AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability §§ 26, 200, 253 (1972); PROSSFM, supra note 12, at §
61.
147. See Rodriguez v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 400 So. 2d 884, 887 (La.
1981).
148. Id.
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proprietor knows or should know of the third person's intention and
apparent ability to execute the acts. 14 As with the previous two
theories, the duty can be used in search of a definition of the TA's duty
but its discharge cannot be considered analogous. While in theory a
transit authority may be analogized to a business proprietor, the TA
must be distinguished by the fact that it maintains its own police
force, 150 which cannot be said of the typical business owner.
VI. Proposals
A. Standard of Care and Duty Owed
The TA should be held to the standard of care required of common
carriers.'' This is the standard used by other jurisdictions. 152 The TA
has avoided liability 153 because it is statutorily designated as perform-
ing a governmental function ,4 and because it maintains its own
police force.15 Except for these two facts, the TA performs what other
jurisdictions label as proprietary functions. Therefore, the appropri-
ate standard of care should be that required of a common carrier.
Recognition of this standard requires an attendant duty to exercise a
high degree of care to prevent injuries to passengers. 50 The TA,
admittedly, cannot protect all of its 2.8 million daily passengers.15 7
However, it should be held liable for criminal attacks when it reasona-
bly could expect criminal activity from anyone at its stations and it
fails to take necessary preventative action. 58 Whether it could reason-
ably expect criminal activity to occur at a particular station depends
upon whether the TA is on notice that the station presents a dangerous
condition. is0
149. Id.
150. See N.Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW § 1204(16) (McKinney 1982), supra note
25.
151. See supra note 20.
152. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
154. See N.Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW § 1202(2) (McKinney 1982), supra note
21.
155. See N.Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW § 1204(16) (McKinney 1982), supra note
25.
156. See supra note 20 for a discussion of the common carrier doctrine.
157. See supra note I for the total annual ridership.
158. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of how notice
affects liability.
159. See supra note 84 for a discussion of the possible definitions of "notice" and
"dangerous condition."
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An alternative argument for liability rests upon the assumption of a
duty which creates a special relationship between the TA and its
passengers.16 0 Just as a duty may have been assumed when a carrier
installed surveillance cameras,' 6 ' a duty may be assumed when, for
example, the TA creates off-hour waiting areas;' 6 2 installs mirrors and
closed-circuit televisions;' 6 3 or uses colored lanterns to alert night
riders that a station is closed or does not have a token booth in
operation.'6 4 Liability would then attach to the TA if it negligently
failed to maintain the safety measures and operate the protective
systems. 165
B. Funding Municipal Liability
The argument that to increase the TA's tort liability would be
financially disastrous must be tempered by the counter-argument that
the "floodgates" will remain shut so long as the TA corrects the
problems posing threats to passenger safety. The TA maintains statis-
tics that illustrate the patterns of criminal activity; this enables it to
determine which are the most dangerous stations. 16 6 By holding the
TA liable for crimes occurring at stations which are known to have
dangerous conditions, the TA would be encouraged to develop, oper-
ate and maintain safety measures at these stations.
If the TA should fail to take preventative safety measures, or be
negligent in the operation and maintenance of existing systems, fund-
ing to cover the cost of the increased liability may be generated in a
number of ways. The TA should adopt the automatic fare collection
system that is used in cities such as Boston'6 7 and Paris.'18 The system
160. See supra notes 97-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "special
relationship" theory of tort liability.
161. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the theory
that a duty is created upon the installation of surveillance equipment for passenger
security.
162. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1982, at B1, col. 1.
163. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1982, at B4, col. 3.
164. Id.
165. A recent example may indicate grounds for liability: in May 1981, the TA
installed closed-circuit television cameras in the 59th Street - Columbus Circle sub-
way station and a system of 76 television screens was monitored by police around the
clock. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1983, at 27, col. 3. During the year ending May 1982,
reported felonies actually increased 30% over the previous year without the equip-
ment. Id. Given the theory posited in Eisman, it would appear that the TA assumed
a duty and may be liable for at least some of these crimes. See supra notes 131-34 and
accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1983, at B9, col. 4.
167. See N.Y. Times, May 2, 1983, at B1, col. 1.
168. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at B2, col. 1.
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involves passenger use of a plastic card with a magnetic strip, similar
to a credit card, that is inserted into a turnstile "reader" to gain
entrance to the station."" These cards would be purchased either on a
monthly basis with unlimited trips for a flat fare or on an individual
trip basis. 17 0 The board of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
has committed $150 million to the purchase and installation of an
automatic fare collection system on New York's subways, buses and
commuter lines over the next three years. 171
Such a system would reduce costs and the savings could be ear-
marked to offset the cost of increased liability. The automatic system
would concentrate revenue collection at the beginning of the month
which would enable the TA to get a more profitable return on its
investments. 172 Moreover, there would be manpower savings at the
token booth and the laborious task of collecting fare-box revenue
would be virtually eliminated. 173
The TA would also save money by reducing the amount of fare-
evasion. Currently, a major problem in this area involves the presence
of "slam gates" which are supposed to be used only for exiting but
which are often used to obtain free entrance. 174 It is estimated that the
TA loses $30-40 million annually because of fare-evasion. 175 The TA
proposes to close permanently the "slam gates" after the automatic
system becomes operational and this would effectively reduce its reve-
nue lOSS.17
6
Since it will take an estimated three years to install an automatic
fare collection system, 177 the TA can recoup part of its loss to fare-
evaders by encouraging the adoption of a more efficient process to
collect fines from these persons. An average of 250,000 summons are
issued annually to fare-evaders and approximately 16% of them ap-
pear in court. 17 A special tribunal should be established to handle the
fare-evaders in order to centralize the problem and remove it from an
already burdened court system. 17 If fare-evaders do not appear at the
169. Id. at Al, col. 4.
170. Id.
171. See N.Y. Times, May 2, 1983, at B1, col. 1.
172. Id. at B2, col. 3.
173. Id.
174. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at B2, col. 4.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra note 171.
178. Telephone interview with Captain Dilberger, New York City Transit Police
(Nov. 28, 1983).
179. WPIX Editorial #83-203 written and delivered by Richard N. Hughes (Nov.
11, 1983) (available in Fordham Law School library).
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tribunal, the case should be turned over to a collection agency which
could collect the fines through garnishment and other similar reme-
dies. 180 Moreover, the fines should be increased and the collected
revenue earmarked either for passenger safety or for offsetting the cost
of liability for failure to provide for passenger safety. 8,'
Finally, the TA should investigate the availability of federal grants.
When surveillance cameras were installed in the Columbus Circle and
Times Square subway stations, 182 eighty percent of the $500,000 and
$1.2 million installation costs, respectively, was paid by the Federal
Urban Mass Transit Administration.183 The remaining twenty percent
was paid by New York State and New York City.'8 4 With such a large
percentage of funding coming from federal grants, the TA should
continue to pursue such programs,' 8 5 which would then reduce the
potential tort liability for crime.
VII. Conclusion
'Upon creation of the Department of Transportation and the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, Congress received the
following message from President Johnson:
As long as he has lived in cities, man has struggled with the prob-
lem of urban transportation.
But:
-Never before have these problems affected so many of our citi-
zens.
-Never before has transportation been so important to the devel-
opment of our urban centers.
-Never before have residents of urban areas faced a clearer choice
concerning urban transportation
-shall it dominate and restrict enjoyment of all the values of
urban living, or shall it be shaped to bring convenience and effi-
ciency to our citizens in urban areas. 8
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1983, at 27, col. 3.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604 (West Supp. 1983) for discussion about the
federal urban mass transit grant program.
186. See 49 U.S.C. § 1608 note, Reorg. Plan of 1968, No. 2 (West 1976)
for the text of the message to Congress.
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Although this message was delivered in 1968,187 the language is still
applicable to crimes perpetrated upon mass transit passengers. If
crime is allowed to continue because the TA has no tort liability, then
the fear of such crime will restrict urban life. Passenger security
should be a goal of the TA and must be encouraged through the
recognition of a duty owed by the TA to its passengers.
Robert S. Ondrovic
187. Id.
